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grantor's interest in real property held by them as tenants by the
entirety dissolves the estate and vests the complete title in the
24
grantee.
FRANK

J. HOLROYD,

JR.

Torts--Carriers-Termination of the Carrier-Passenger Relationship
The high degree of care a common carrier owes to its passenger'
necessarily terminates when the carrier-passenger relationship ceases to
exist. Hence it has become incumbent upon courts to fashion standards
against which facts may be tested in order to ascertain the existence or
non-existence of a carrier-passenger relationship.
Journey's End
Whether a carrier-passenger relationship has terminated often depends upon the type of common carrier involved and upon the physical
place of the journey's end. If the passenger is discharged at a railroad
carrier's station, the general rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time and opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.2 The same rule applies when
the passenger alights at a bus station 3 or at an airline terminal. 4 The
' Based on OR. REv. STAT.

§ 108.090 (1953).

1 For a note on the degree of care a common carrier owes to its passenger, see
Note, 17 Ni C. L. REV. 453 (1939).
2 Emerson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 206 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Young v.
Baldwin, 82 F. 2d 841 (8th Cir. 1936) ; MacGregor v. Pacific Electric Ry., 6 Cal.
2d 596, 59 P. 2d 123 (1936) ; Georgia & F. Ry. v. Thigpen, 141 Ga. 90, 80 S. E.
626 (1913); Sink v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 227 Mich. 21, 198 N. W. 238
(1924) ; Galehouse v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 22 N. D. 615, 135 N. W.
189 (1912) ; Wessman v. Boston & M. R. R., 22 N. H. 475, 152 Atl. 476 (1930) ;
Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 220 N. Y. 301, 115 N. E. 704 (1917) ; Layne
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 68 W. Va. 213 69 S. E. 700 (1910). See, Pinson v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 37 F. 2d 652 (5th Cir. 1930). Relation of passengercarrier continued until plaintiff leaving train had a reasonable opportunity to see
about baggage and find means of getting to destination. See also, Fulghum v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 158 N. C. 555, 74 S. E. 584 (1912). Train passenger
alighted in daylight at a flag station. A conductor helped her off and placed her
safely on the ground alongside the railroad track about 60 feet north of a railroad
crossing. Plaintiff, in making her way to the crossing, was injured when she
stepped on a wet crosstie. Carrier's motion to nonsuit was affirmed on the basis
of plaintiff's contributory negligence but Clark, C. J., dissenting, stated that the
plaintiff was still a passenger since she had not left the carrier's premises.
'Crown Coach Co. v. Whitaker, 208 Ark. 535, 186 S. W. 940 (1945) ; Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S. E. 2d 371 (1943).
"Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App., 334, 73 S. E. 2d 598 (1952);
Cf., Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 240 Ni C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954). Although the airport was leased by the city of Charlotte to the air carrier (a common arrangement between municipalities and air carriers) the carrier was held
liable for injuries to one of its passengers who fell in a passageway furnished for
boarding the airplane of the carrier. Accord, Horelick v. Pennsylvania R. R., 13
N. J. 349, 99 A. 2d 652 (1953).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

rule is based on the fact that the carrier exercises complete control over
its premises. 5
In cases where common carriers discharge passengers upon ground
not under the control or supervision of the carrier there is a distinct
conflict of authority as to the obligation of the carrier after the passenger
has left the conveyance. The weight of authority supports the view that
the relation of carrier and passenger ordinarily ends when the passenger
safely steps from the carrier's conveyance to the street. 6 This theory
is grounded on the premise that the carrier, not having control over the
highway or street, is not responsible for safe passage from the street to
the sidewalk.' The minority view favors the rule that the relationship
of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has had a reason8
able opportunity to reach a place of safety.
The North Carolina rule applicable to common carriers who discharge passengers upon ground not under the carrier's control has had
an interesting judicial history. In a recent decision, 9 the court stated
the rule thusly:
Emerson v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 206 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Southeastern Greyhound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26 S. E. 2d 371 (1943).
cAlpine v. Los Angeles Ry., 67 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 911 (1945);
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Hills, 50 Colo. 328, 116 Pac. 125 (1911); Sims v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 4 Ill. 2d 60, 122 N. E. 2d 221 (1954) ; Ferguson v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 159 Kan. 520, 156 P. 2d 869 (1945) ; Oddy v.
West End Street Ry., 178 Mass. 341, 59 N. E. 1026 (1901); Mercier v. Union
Street Ry., 230 Mass. 397, 119 N. E. 764 (1918) ; Kieger v. St. Paul City Ry., 216
Minn. 38, 11 N. W. 2d 757 (1943) ; Smuzynski v. East St. Louis Ry., 230 Mo. App.
1095, 93 S. W. 2d 1058 (1936); Wilson v. Berlin Street Ry., 84 N. H. 285, 149
Atl. 602 (1930); Hudak v. Penn-Ohio Coach Lines Co., 73 Ohio App. 409, 57
N. E. 2d 93 (1943) ; Burke v. United Electric Ry., 79 R. I. 50, 83 A. 2d 88 (1951) ;
Street Ry. v. Boddy, 105 Tenn. 669 (1900); San Antonio Public Service Co. v.
Turpin, 153 S. W. 2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Wullbrant v. City of Seattle,
196 Wash. 645, 84 P. 2d 123 (1938) ; Welsh v. Spokane & I. E. R. R., 91 Wash.
260, 157 Pac. 679 (1916).
' Creamer v. West End Street Ry., 156 Mass. 321 (1892); Hudak v. PennOhio Coach Lines Co., 73 Ohio App. 409, 57 N. E. 2d 93 (1943); San Antonio
Public
Service Co. v. Turpin, 153 S. W. 2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
8
Louisville Ry. v. Allen, 246 S. W. 2d 443 (Ky. App. 1951) ; Beahan v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 213 S. W. 2d 253 (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1948) ; Jacobson
v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry., 109 Neb. 356, 191 N. W. 327 (1922);
German v. Muskingum Valley Transit Co., 94 N. E. 2d 52 (Ohio Com. P1. 1951);
Trail v. Tulsa Street Ry., 97 Okla. 19, 222 Pac. 950 (1924) ; Houston Transit Co. v.
McQuade, 223 S. W. 2d 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Wittkower v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 291 S. W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Stidham,
191 Va. 790, 62 S. E. 2d 894 (1951) ; Culpeper National Bank v. Tidewater Improvement Co., 119 Va. 136, 89 S. E. 118 (1916) ; Zalewski v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co., 219 Wis. 541, 263 N. W. 577 (1936); Will v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis. 38, 171 N. W. 658 (1919). But cf. Cavazos v. Geronimo
Bus Lines, 56 N. M. 624, 247 P. 2d 865 (1952). Carrier-passenger relationship continues until the passenger is safely discharged from the conveyance in a place in
which he may safely remain.
'Harris v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 243 N. C. 346, 90 S. E. 2d 710 (1956).
The facts, as supported by a jury verdict for the plaintiff, showed that the place
where plaintiff attempted to alight from a bus at night was at or near the north
end of a parapet, not far from an intersection; and that, as he stepped off the bus
onto the shoulder of the highway, his foot struck something soft and he was precipitated some ten feet onto the rock bed of a stream and knocked unconscious.
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"The carrier's legal duty to its passenger continues until such
time as it affords its passenger an opportunity to alight safely
from its conveyance to a place of safety."'10 Three North Carolina cases were cited by the court in support2 of this
standard." All three were rendered by bare court majorities.'
The problem was first seriously considered by the North Carolina
court in Wood v. North CarolinaPublic Service Corp.,'3 where plaintiff,
a streetcar passenger, while alighting at a regular stopping place, "had
just stepped off the car and hadn't taken a single step" when she was
struck by an automobile. The majority opinion recognized that there
was a conflict of authority as to the obligation of the carrier after the
passenger has left the car, but chose to uphold a judgment for the plaintiff on the theory that the carrier breached its duty to protect its passenger from and warn her of danger as well as to see that she alighted in
safety.' 4 It was not until four years later, when the court decided Loggins v. Southern Pacific Utilities Co., 15 that we find a determined effort
on the part of the court to fashion a local standard from the conflict of
authority it again recognized. The facts of the Loggins case disclose
that plaintiff's intestate, his nine-year-old son, left a streetcar with his
father to transfer to another car. As the father reached the sidewalk
he asked his son about their lunchbasket. The boy, who was still in the
street just a few feet from the curbing, instantly turned, reentered the
streetcar, got the basket and "....

just as he got off the car and got one

step," an automobile ran over him. On trial, defendant carrier's motion
to nonsuit was allowed. In sending the case back for a new trial the
court announced this rule for street car carriers:
"We think a fair statement of the rule would be to say that a
passenger, on alighting from a streetcar at the end of his journey,
loses his status as a passenger when he has stepped from the car to
at 350, 90 S. E. 2d at 713.
" White v. Chappell, 219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. 2d 843 (1941) ; Loggins v. Southern Pacific Utilities Co., 181 N. C. 221, 106 S. E. 822 (1921) ; Wood v. North
Carolina Public Service Corp., 174 N. C. 697, 94 S. E. 459 (1917).
12 The Wood case was a 3-2 decision with a dissenting opinion expressing the
view that the carrier-passenger relationship should be terminated when the passenger
on a street car alights upon the street from the car. The Loggins case was also a
3-2 split in which the dissenting justices recorded no opinion. In the White case
the court divided 4-3 with the dissenters taking the position that the carrier breached
its duty in failing to warn an alighting passenger (a young child) of the known
danger from an approaching automobile.
13 174 N. C. 697, 94 S. E. 459 (1917).
z, The court seemed to base its decision on the fact that the carrier failed to
warn its passenger of the danger of impending traffic hazards more than on the
"landing in safety" theory. The North Carolina court later repudiated this idea as
a duty of the carrier in White v. Chappell, 219 N. C. 652, 14 S. E. 2d 843 (1941).
Accord, Beeson v. Tri-State Transit Co., 146 F. 2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34 (1943).
'"181 N. C. 221, 106 S. E. 822 (1921).
10 Id.
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a place of safety on a street or on a highway. The question should
not be made to depend entirely upon the number of steps which
the passenger may take on leaving the car, but rather upon the
circumstances and conditions under which he alights. He is entitled to be discharged in a proper manner and at a time and place
reasonably safe for that purpose."'"
It should also be noted that in the Loggins case the court was aided in
its decision by the fact that plaintiff's intestate was a transfer passenger.17
White v. Chappell's was the first North Carolina case on this point to
involve a bus carrier. There, plaintiff's intestate, an eight-year-old boy,
accompanied by his mother, got off the bus on the side of the road, went
around to the back of the bus and when he attempted to dart across the
highway was struck and killed by a passing automobile. In ruling that
defendant carrier's motion for a nonsuit should have been granted, the
court, referring to the Loggins case, stated that:
"... the ruling there that the duty of the carrier to an alighting
passenger extends not only to 'a safe landing' but to 'a landing in
safety' is the limit to which any of the courts have carried the
principle,' 9 even where the passenger alights on the traveled por'20
tion of the street or highway."
Thus it seems that the North Carolina rule is a modification of the
minority view in this respect: the minority rule allows the passenger
time to reach a safe place after alighting from the carrier before the relation is severed; the North Carolina rule calls for "a landing in safety," 21
defined as the condition in which the passenger finds himself immediately
after alighting. This, too, might involve an-element of time; but, obtaining an immediate place of safety is manifestly different from moving
to a place of safety. Hence it appears that the North Carolina rule will
not be extended to designate a person with the name of "passenger"
when, upon reaching his destination, he has passed through the "landing
in safety" phase. Furthermore, it is now quite clear that the "landing
'8 Id. at 225, 106 S. E. at 823.
favorably

17 This factor was recognized in the majority opinion which quoted
from an earlier transfer case, Clark v. Durham Traction Co., 138 N. C. 77, 50
S. E. 518 (1905). There the court said: "A person in transferring from one car
to the other is still a passenger, the transfer being but a part of the trip, for the
whole of which the company agrees to convey in safety."
18219 N. C. 652, 14 S.E. 2d 843 (1941).
19 Obviously the court was not thinking of the prevailing minority view supported by cases cited in note 8 supra. See also, Birmingham Ry., Light & Power
Co. v. O'Brien, 185 Ala. 617, 64 So. 343 (1914).
20219 N. C. 652, 660, 14 S.E. 2d 843, 848 (1941).
21 In the Loggnhs case the court stressed the difference between a safe landing
and a landing in safety. The former has reference to the act of the passenger in
stepping from the car to the street; the latter to the condition in which he finds
himself immediately after accomplishing this act.
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in safety" rule, initially adopted for streetcar carriers, will22likewise receive equal judicial sanction in cases involving bus carriers.
There have been a few cases where the carrier-passenger relationship
has been considered when the carrier was a taxicab. As a rule, the
rider usually loses his status as passenger when he opens the door and
leaves the conveyance ;23 however, if the passenger has not paid his fare,
relationship may continue even after the rider walks
the carrier-passenger
24
cab.
the
from
away
If the passenger remains on the carrier after the carrier has reached
the passenger's destination, some cases hold that the passenger's status
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time to leave the con26
veyance.25 Thirty minute has been held not to be a reasonable time.
Temporary Departures
From a review of the cases involving temporary departures from
the original carrier the general rule seems to be that a passenger does
not lose his character as such by merely temporarily alighting at an
intermediate station, with the express or implied consent of the carrier,
28
for any reasonable or lawful purpose2 7 such as eating breakfast, exer3
29
cising on the platform, talking with acquaintances, " meeting someone
32
on business, 3 ' getting off the conveyance to let another passenger on,
34
33
sending a telegram, visiting a rest room or even for the purpose of
satisfying an aroused curiosity.35 On the other hand the relationship has
been deemed to have been severed where the passenger left the carrier's
36
station temporarily to talk to a person on a country road or where the
-"-The rule adopted by the North Carolina court was first announced in the
in the White (bus) and Harris (bus) cases.
Loggins case (street car) and followed Liability
Insurance Co., 62 So. 2d 173 (La.
"Barringer v. Employer's Mutual
App. 1952) ; White v. Alleghany Cab Co., 29 N. Y. S. 2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
.Tarman v. Southard, 205 F. 2d 705 (D. C. Cir. 1953); Dayton v. Yellow
Cab Co., 193 P. 2d 959 (Cal. App. 1948). Both of these cases were situations where
the cab driver assaulted the passenger as a result of a dispute over the price of
the fare.
2" Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Millirons, 87 Ga. App. 334, 73 S. E. 2d 598 (1952);
Valdosta Street Ry. v. Fenn, 11 Ga. App. 586, 75 S. E. 984 (1912); Turner v.
Wabash Ry., 211 S. W. 101 (Mo. App. 1919).
"Duval v. Inland Navigation Co., 90 Wash. 149, 155 Pac. 768 (1916).
; Wallace
2" Delta Air Corp. v. Porter, 70 Ga. App. 152, 27 S. E. 2d 758 (1943)
Southern R. R., 174 N. C. 171, 93 S. E. 731 (1917).
v. Norfolk
8
(1927).
218
114
So.
" Louisville & N. R. R. v. McCue, 216 Ala. 616,
"0Sellers v. Southern Pacific Co., 33 Cal. App. 701, 166 Pac. 599 (1917).
"0Arkansas C. R. R. v. Bennett, 82 Ark. 393, 102 S. W. 198 (1907).
S. E. 731 (1917).
Wallace v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 174 N. C. 171, 93 S.
E. 2d 852 (1943).
Ross v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 223 N. C. 239, 25
"Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. 455 (5th Cir. 1898).
" Murray v. Cedar Rapids City Lines, Inc., 48 N. W. 2d 256 (Iowa 1951);
Wilson v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 217 N. C. 586, 9 S. E. 2d 1 (1940);
Goodman v. Queen City Lines, Inc., 208 N. C. 323, 180 S. E. 661 (1935).
Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. v. Harrelson, 14 F. 2d 893 (8th Cir. 1926).
" Palmer v. Willamette Valley Southern Ry., 88 Ore. 322, 171 Pac. 1169 (1918).
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passenger does not return in time to board the conveyance before de37

parture.

Transfers
In the cases involving transfer passengers, that is, where the passenger leaves the original carrier to board another carrier in order to complete his journey, the courts are fairly evenly divided on the question of
whether a passenger retains his status as such while effectuating the
transfer.3 8
In the North Carolina case of Patterson v. Duke Power Co.,30 plaintiff, with a transfer ticket in his hand, knocked on the door of the urban
bus he was transferring to and as the bus moved off without letting the
plaintiff on, the plaintiff was thrown backwards and injured. Holding
that defendant carrier's motion for nonsuit should have been upheld, the
court concluded that:
"... sound reason compels the conclusion that ordinarily a passenger who has obtained a transfer and has safely alighted from one
bus with the intent to transfer to another is not a passenger while
traveling on the public street for the purpose of making the transfer so as to impose upon the carrier the duty to protect him
40
against the hazards of the street."
The court distinguished the Patterson case from Clark v. Durham Traction Co.41 on the ground that in the Clark case, plaintiff, having left the
original carrier, had put his foot on the step of the second carrier's conveyance-implying that the carrier-passenger relationship had been restored. Whereas in the Pattersoncase the door of the conveyance closed
as the plaintiff approached, giving clear notice that the bus was taking
42
on no more passengers, and no actual effort was made to get aboard.
Thus it appears that the North Carolina court will require, in transfer
cases, some act by the transferring party to reestablish his "passenger"
Tuder v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 135 Minn. 294, 160 N. W. 785 (1917).
That he does: Damm v. East Penn Transportation Co., 120 Pa. Supp. 381,
182 AtI. 720 (1936) ; Keator v. Scranton Traction Co., 191 Pa. St. 102 (1899).
That he does not: McAlpine v. Los Angeles Ry., 67 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d
911 (1945) ; Pugh v. City of Monroe, 6 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 1942) ; O'Connor v.
Larrabee, 267 Wis. 185, 64 N. W. 2d 815 (1954). See also, South Plains Coaches v.
Box, 111 S.W. 2d 1151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). When bus broke down, the passenger, on request of bus driver, continued part of the journey in a truck driven
by a person not employed by the bus company. It was held that the plaintiff did
not cease to be a passenger of the bus company by so doing.
40 226 N. C. 22, 36 S. E. 2d 713 (1945).
40
Id. at 26, 36 S.E. 2d at 715.
4.138 N. C. 77, 50 S.E. 518 (1905).
42 The court also stated that plaintiff's desire to get aboard was not communicated to the driver at a time when it could be done in safety or while the bus was
open for the reception of passengers.
38

19561

NOTES AND COMMENTS

status before it will hold the carrier responsible for the duties imposed
by reason of the carrier-passenger relationship.
HORACE E. STACY, JR.

Torts-Doctor's Liability for "Unauthorized Operations"
While performing an authorized appendectomy on the plaintiff, defendant doctor punctured cysts on the plaintiff's left ovary and drained
fluid therefrom. He is charged with assault and trespass for performing
the unauthorized cyst punctures.' Plaintiff's testimony indicated express
consent only to the removal of the appendix. Defendant's evidence did
not controvert this but showed by five duly qualified medical experts that
the puncture of such cysts during an appendectomy is good surgical practice performed in such situations. No emergency immediately endangering the health of the patient was shown. Plaintiff appeals from the
entry of nonsuit taken after the presentation of the above evidence. The
2
decision of the lower court was affirmed on appeal.
"In such case the consent-in absence of proof to the contrarywill be construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend
the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the
area of the original incision whenever he, in the exercise of his
sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such an extension of the operation
originally contemplated."8
There seems to be no disagreement among the cases that consent in
some form must be present for any operation. 4 The form that this consent takes is generally spoken of as either express consent or implied
consent.
Express consent is usually found when a very broad, general assent
is given to the physician wherein he is told to remedy the situation 5 or
to do whatever is necessary to give relief.6 Consent to one operation is
not, however, consent to a second.7 Nor can a surgeon, during an
' Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). An allegation of
negligence in the cutting of a blood vessel on the ovary resulting in phlebitis of the
left leg was not urged on appeal although mentioned in the pleadings and in the trial
below. [Record, p. 3.]
'Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). Cf. RESTATEMENT,
ToRts § 62, illustration 5 (1934).
Id. at 362, 90 S. E. 2d at 759.
'Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N. E. 910 (1919) ; White v. Hirshfield, 108 Okla. 263, 236 Pac. 406 (1925) ; Valdey v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485,
96 P. 2d 142 (1939); Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (1943).
McClallen v. Adams, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) 333, 31 Am. Dec. 140 (1837) ; King
v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) ; Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W.
2d 7 (1944).
'McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930).
'Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906).

